

The Hidden World of Multilateralism: Treaty Commitments of Newly Democratized States in Europe¹

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Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.

Recent empirical studies confirm the conventional wisdom that European states are at the forefront of multilateralism in the post-Cold war era. What is particularly noteworthy is the high commitment level of new European democracies to multilateral treaties (Elsig, Milewicz, and Stürchler 2011). These countries are much more likely to ratify multilateral treaties than other new democracies. Yet, the democratization literature is short on theoretical explanations to account for the observed variation in ratification patterns. The leading

explanation refers to new democracies' use of international law as a "lock-in" instrument (Moravcsik 2000). The argument suggests that governments join multilateral institutions in order to cement domestic reforms and policies. But no explanation is offered for the variation among newly democratized states in terms of their engagement with the multilateral system.

This article tackles this puzzle and offers a novel explanation for why newly democratized states in Europe are among the top ratifiers of post-Cold War multilateral treaties. We suggest that these states use treaties not as an *internal* lock-in signal, but as an *external* signal communicating specific foreign policy objectives. These signals are intended to strengthen their international reputation, to increase strategic autonomy, and to please the European Union (EU) as the key sponsor of multilateralism.

The Conventional Argument: New Democracies, Credibility and Lock In

An important body of literature addresses the role of new democracies in international relations and in international law, and shows that newly democratized states are more likely to join international organizations and ratify international treaties than are other states. One important reason for the active use of international law is related to the governments' need to address concerns of (domestic) credibility. New democracies need to deal with time inconsistency (the fact that government's incentives change over time) and the problem of incomplete or asymmetric information (see Barro and Gordon 1983; Canzoneri 1985; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rodrik 1989). Especially in transitional countries with new authorities in office, a short political life expectancy, and a legacy of governmental incentives to renege on promises, the public may lack information and therefore be generally skeptical about the new government's motives. In order to mitigate this internal credibility problem, the government of a newly established democracy must send a serious signal of true intentions. Consequently, newly democratized states rely more than other states

on international institutions as a communication device vis-à-vis internal constituencies, in order to build up their credibility.

The dominant version of the communication device has been termed “lock in.” In the face of political uncertainty, governments lock in favored policies within intergovernmental democratic networks buffering against future governments’ incentives to undo domestic reforms (Moravcsik 2000:226, 228; Pinto 1993:43). There exist different versions of the lock-in argument. One strand emphasizes the goal of “locking in” democratization to minimize the risk of democratic reversal. It reflects the governmental efforts to consolidate democracy in order to protect it against non-democratic opponents. Another strand explains the participation of transitional states in regional institutions such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a means of bolstering security-related or economic reforms at home. Lock in describes an attempt to pre-empt domestically induced weakening of reforms that are important for stabilization, economic reform or building reputation (Goldstein 1998:143-44; Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006).

Notwithstanding different objectives, “locking in” is mainly understood as an *internal signal* to political opponents and the domestic public. It has been prominently applied in various issue areas. Moravcsik for instance, examining the European Court of Human Rights, argues that governments of newly established democracies join the regime as a tactical move “to consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-à-vis non-democratic political threats” (2000:220; see also Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). In the case of new EU democracies, the lock-in instrument manifests itself mainly through joining regional regimes such as the EU and NATO (Pevehouse 2002b; Schimmelfennig 2005). The lock-in argument is also well-known in relation to trade agreements. Using stock market data from Mexico, Tomz (1997) provides strong evidence that NAFTA made trade reforms more credible. He shows that agreements can exert a powerful effect on the

trustworthiness of reforms. In sum, the existing empirical evidence indicates that the lock-in mechanism is particularly important in the context of regional institutions.

We posit that locking in is less relevant in the context of multilateral agreements. We conjecture that if new democracies find themselves confronted with a prominent regional institution (like the EU or NATO), this will provide the prime institutional framework for their lock-in intentions. By implication, these states will commit to multilateral treaties for other reasons.

Our Argument: Multilateral Treaties and External Signals

We argue that multilateral treaties are important *external signals*. We understand them as alternative tools of communication to the inward-oriented lock-in mechanism. They serve goals other than democratic consolidation or economic reforms, and are not directed at the domestic public or domestic opponents, but address a different audience. External signals are outward-oriented and are sent by governments to the international community or international and regional organizations to communicate their foreign policy objectives in international politics. Put differently, states use external and internal signals to pursue different objectives and to target different audiences. We distinguish three types of external signals in the context of new European democracies. Table 1 summarizes the three signals and lists the action, objective and the receiver.

TABLE 1. Treaty Ratification as External Signaling Device

<i>Sender</i>	<i>Action</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Signal</i>	<i>Receiver</i>
New EU democracies	Treaty ratification	Improve international reputation	RECOGNITION	International community
		Conduct quasi-autonomous foreign policy-making	STRATEGIC AUTONOMY	Russia & members in multilateral fora
		Show willingness to follow the multilateral lead of the EU	PLEASING EU	Regional organization (EU or NATO)

The first RECOGNITION signal reflects the objective of newly democratized European states to achieve acceptance by the international community. Whereas many new democracies in other parts of the world were prominently active in bilateral, regional or international treaty-making prior to regime transition, new democracies in Europe (under the influence of the Soviet Union) were heavily constrained as independent actors in world politics. The 1990s provided them with a new opportunity to remedy this deficiency by actively participating in treaty-making as well as through ratifying a set of treaties that were previously negotiated by other states. Therefore, participation is explained by new EU democracies' desire for international acceptance and recognition. Commitment to international agreements enhances recognition and increases the perceived legitimacy of a state (Franck 1990; Hurd 1999). Recognition is a constituting factor of state sovereignty. "Recognition is an institution of State practice that can resolve uncertainties as to status and allow for new situations to be regularized" (Crawford 2007:27). In this sense, foreign policy tools are used to signal new sovereignty as a state. There are various tools available, including legal practice (customary international law) or credible implementation. For latecomers, the process of establishing customs and credible commitment through implementation is, however, too lengthy. Therefore, consent to existing international treaties offers a "short cut" to international recognition.² Following this logic, the act of ratifying multilateral treaties is the search for a seal of approval by the international community.

The second STRATEGIC AUTONOMY signal represents attempts by newly democratized states to conduct quasi-autonomous foreign policy-making to overcome strategic gaps not addressed directly by the RECOGNITION signal. Two objectives stand out. First, ratifying security and crime-related multilateral treaties can work as an additional *assurance device*. It is worth recalling that new democracies were faced with significant security threats in the aftermath of the Cold War. As accession to NATO, especially, was not a foregone conclusion

and could not address all security challenges, new European democracies used multilateral treaties to address strategic objectives. The main addressee was clearly Russia as the successor state of the former Soviet Union. Concerns were high in particular in the Baltic states and many other Central and Eastern European states (Haerpfer, Milosinski, and Wallace 1999). Second, new EU democracies may ratify multilateral agreements as a means of conducting *autonomous foreign policy*. This is related to the issue of uncertainty about the behavior of other actors and about future challenges (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Participating in multilateral treaties (for example, by ratifying framework agreements), will enable these states to play a more influential part in future treaty-making (for example, protocols).

The third PLEASING EU signal is used by newly democratized governments as an alternative instrument to communicate directly to the EU their willingness to follow the EU lead in multilateralism. The number one foreign policy objective in the European context has been EU and NATO memberships. By signaling adherence to common EU norms and values and support of EU positions, this instrument is destined to generate goodwill for accession negotiations. Multilateral commitments have been well received in Brussels and by member states, not least, because the EU and many old EU member states have been the chief supporters of multilateralism for quite some time. In addition, new democracies have been confronted since the early 1990s with a number of criteria to be fulfilled before they could join the EU. The Copenhagen Declaration of 1993 referred to “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” as criteria for membership. Therefore, newly democratized European states ratify multilateral treaties to signal to the EU that they are reliable multilateral partners and are working toward fulfilling EU conditions for entry.

While we expect these three signals to have a positive effect on the ratification rates of new EU democracies, we also investigate how the relevance of the three signals is conditioned by issue area. In some areas, all three signals will be equally at work; in other policy fields one signal might outweigh the others. Some of the signals (for example, pleasing the EU) will be also less relevant for other new (non-European) democracies' decisions to ratify multilateral treaties. This should lead to observable differences in the rate and pace of ratification for new democracies within and outside Europe.

In testing our argument, we also pay attention to the fact that new democracies might join multilateral treaties for other reasons than those outlined above. They might want to reap short-term benefits (for example, transfer payments or technical assistance) or to express a genuine and sincere commitment toward multilateralism.

Empirical Analysis

We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, to gauge the expected level of treaty participation of new EU democracies (in comparison with other groups of states) we apply event history analysis drawing on an original ratification data set. Second, we examine arguments raised during parliamentary ratification debates in Central and Eastern European countries in order to trace the underlying motivations. Third, to illustrate the different motives driving new democracies' approaches toward multilateralism, we contrast parliamentary discussions related to treaty ratifications in Europe with parliamentary discussions in Latin America.

Patterns of Treaty Commitment in the Post-Cold War Era

In order to demonstrate that new EU democracies are strong supporters of multilateralism, we analyze ratification data for 76 post-Cold War multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 and 2005. An overview of the selected treaties is presented in Table A1 of the appendix. We do not carry out a direct test of our external signaling arguments in this section, but provide

evidence that the likelihood of treaty ratification varies across newly established democracies within and outside Europe.

For the purpose of this analysis, we use event history techniques. Event history modeling offers an appropriate method for analyzing the timing of political change, i.e., the change in status from non-ratification to ratification. It not only considers which states ratify treaties, but also takes into account that states do so with different time lags. Furthermore, event history techniques can be applied to data with “multiple events per subject” (Therneau and Grambsch 2000). In this study, each subject under observation can experience multiple and parallel events. Since our goal is to demonstrate the overall pattern of multilateral treaty commitment – rather than to examine the ratification of individual treaties per se – we need to take into account that each state can ratify up to 76 treaties. The state is the “subject” of the analysis and is at risk of experiencing the “event” of ratifying a treaty. That is, a particular state can ratify several treaties, and it can ratify any number of these treaties in the same year.

In order to account for this specification, we organized the data as a counting process following the approach of Andersen and Gill (1982) (AG). The AG approach is particularly suited to analyzing mutual independence of the observations within a subject (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002:1073–74; Therneau and Grambsch 2000:185–86). It assumes that multiple events for any particular subject are conditionally independent; the risk of experiencing the event for a given subject is unaffected by any earlier event that happened to the same subject. Put differently, state A can ratify treaty X without or before ratifying treaty Y, and state B can ratify treaty Y without or before ratifying treaty X. The counting process data consists of multiple records and is set up as annual intervals.³ By clustering on states, we are able to account for correlated groups of observations (non-independence of multiple ratifications per state) applying robust sandwich variance estimators based on a grouped jackknife (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:158).⁴

We report the results on the basis of modified Kaplan-Meier survivor curves and Cox proportional hazards regression models with the modified partial likelihood for left-truncated and right-censored data (Tableman and Kim 2004).⁵

Main Explanatory Variable

We operationalize new democracies with two related measures: a categorical variable measuring whether a state is a “new democracy” (reference category), AUTOCRACY, ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACY or OTHER; and a dichotomous variable NEW DEMOCRACY measuring whether a state falls under the category “new democracy” or “not new democracy”. Both variables measure the domestic regime type of a state and are based on the polity2 score ranging from –10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) from the Polity IV index (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). We define new democracies as states which averaged a value of less than 1 on the Polity IV scale in the 1970 to 1988 period, and averaged a value of 5 or more between 2000 and 2007. Autocracies are defined by an average value of less than 1 for both periods. Established democracies averaged values of greater or equal 5 in both periods. States which do not fall under any of the three categories are coded as “other.” In addition, we created a binary EU variable controlling for whether or not a state was a member of the European Union as of 2008.⁶

Controls

In order to grasp the explanatory range of “new democracies,” we control for alternative explanations in the Cox proportional hazards regressions.

First, to capture the extent to which commitment to multilateral institutions is solely driven by the degree of state power, we use a MILITARY POWER indicator composed of three variables: military expenditure (in thousands of current year US\$), military personnel (in thousands) and energy consumption (in thousands of US coal-ton equivalents) (Milewicz 2010, based on Correlates of War Project 2007). Because powerful states are more assertive

and influential than weak states in negotiating and designing treaties, they can shape the content of treaties to make them congruent with their own interests. Therefore, powerful states find that treaty ratification entails obligations with little or no constraining effect (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996).

Second, we control for the extent to which a state is economically interconnected with the global economy using the variable *TRADE OPENNESS* (total trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)) (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009). Countries that are more interdependent with the global economic system generally will be more supportive of strengthening multilateral regulatory governance than countries with limited economic ties.

We also control for the effect of state duration and colonial past. The dichotomous variable *STATE DURATION* indicates whether a state gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.⁷ The newer the state, the more it will be concerned with its sovereignty and therefore the less likely to ratify multilateral agreements. The dichotomous variable *COLONIAL PAST* determines whether a state has been colonized by a Western colonial power since 1700. The focus is exclusively on “Western overseas” colonialism (Teorell and Hadenius 2005). As past experience with colonialism is linked to a state’s struggle for independence, we expect former colonies to be reluctant to bind themselves through multilateral treaties.

Finally, we also test whether the overall effects remain unchanged when we control for issue areas. We include binary variables for three major issue areas covered in our sample: *HUMAN RIGHTS* (including human rights, cultural and public health agreements), *SECURITY* (including security, crime and diplomatic relations), and *ENVIRONMENT* (“trade” is the reference category).

Results

Our results support the general argument that new EU democracies are strong supporters of post-Cold War multilateralism. Figure 1 shows that the ratification pace in the period 1990 to

2008 differs significantly for new democracies within and outside the European Union. New EU democracies consistently ratified the 76 selected multilateral treaties at a faster rate than non-EU democracies.




FIG 1. Kaplan-Meier Curve for New Democracies within the EU and outside the EU

(Note. Not all 76 selected treaties were open for ratification from the start of the study in 1990 only; about 30% of the 76 treaties were adopted before 1995, and only 14.5% before 1994 (for dates of adoption see table A1). This accounts for the fact that there is no difference in the percentage of ratifications between new democracies within and outside the EU until the mid-1990s).

This finding holds across different policy fields (see Figure 2). New EU democracies ratify multilateral treaties more rapidly in all four issue areas. Differences in the ratification pace are most evident in the areas of crime & security, and human rights.




FIG 2. Kaplan-Meier Curves for New Democracies by Issue Areas of Multilateral Treaties
 (Note. Not all 76 selected treaties have been open for ratification from the start of the study in 1990. In the case of environmental treaties the average date of adoption was 1997).

In order to assess the effect of “new democracies” and “new EU democracies” under the *ceteris paribus* assumption, we use Cox proportional hazards regression models. The Cox proportional hazards model estimates hazard ratios for the variables discussed above. The hazard ratio⁸ is the exponential of the regression coefficient ($\exp(\text{coef})$) in the model and measures the effect of the variable. A hazard ratio of 1 indicates that there is no effect on state commitment to international agreements. A ratio of more than 1 indicates an increase in the rate of ratification, and a ratio of less than 1 indicates a reduction in the rate of ratification.

Any statement that a state is more likely to commit is also a statement that the state is more likely to commit earlier and vice versa. The results from the Cox proportional hazards regressions are presented in table 2.

TABLE 2. Results – Cox Proportional Hazards Models

	<i>Model 1</i> exp(coef) (<i>p</i>)	<i>Model 2</i> exp(coef) (<i>p</i>)	<i>Model 3</i> exp(coef) (<i>p</i>)	<i>Model 4</i> exp(coef) (<i>p</i>)	<i>Model 5</i> exp(coef) (<i>p</i>)	<i>Model 6</i> exp(coef) (<i>p</i>)
NEW DEMOCRACY			1.36 0.00***	1.34 0.00***	1.42 0.00***	1.46 0.00***
AUTOCRACY (COMP. TO NEW DEMO.)	0.54 0.00***	0.58 0.00***				
ESTAB. DEMOCRACY (COMP. TO NEW DEMO.)	1.06 0.42	0.99 0.91				
OTHER (COMP. TO NEW DEMO.)	0.71 0.00***	0.71 0.00***				
EU		1.58 0.00***		1.92 0.00***	2.21 0.00***	2.23 0.00***
NEW DEMOCRACIES*EU					0.72 0.00***	0.69 0.00***
STATE DURATION	0.88 0.2	0.91 0.19				
TRADE OPENNESS	1.00 0.74	1.00 0.36	1.00 0.36	1.00 0.14		1.00 0.21
COLONIAL PAST	0.79 0.002**	0.96 0.56	0.75 0.00***	0.98 0.84		0.96 0.63
MILITARY POWER	0.44 0.09	0.84 0.7	0.83 0.75	1.78 0.23		1.54 0.39
HUMAN RIGHTS						1.45 0.00***
ENVIRONMENT						1.43 0.00***
SECURITY						2.1 0.00***
Likelihood ratio test (<i>p</i>)	508.6 (0)	613 (0)	234.1 (0)	460.2 (0)	512.3 (0)	832.3 (0)
Wald test (<i>p</i>)	118.3 (0)	262.4 (0)	55.3 (0)	177.9 (0)	220.1 (0)	424.7 (0)
Robust score logrank test (<i>p</i>)	60.79 (0)	63.39 (0)	37.05 (0)	45.24 (0)	45.81 (0)	91.3 (0)
No. Observations	77051	77051	77051	77051	87605	77051
No. Events	5013	5013	5013	5013	5482	5013
No. States	152	152	152	152	159	152
Period	1991-2007	1991-2007	1991-2007	1991-2007	1991-2008	1991-2007

(Note. The likelihood ratio test assumes independence of observations within a cluster (country), the Wald and robust score tests do not. *** $p|z| < 0.001$, ** $p|z| < 0.01$, * $p|z| < 0.05$).

Models 1 and 2 show the effect for new democracies based on the categorical “new democracy” variable. Both models reveal that autocracies (model 1: 54%, model 2: 58%) and

“other” states (71% in models 1 and 2) have significantly lower ratification likelihoods than do new democracies. Differences between new and established democracies, however, are not statistically significant. Model 2 reveals that an EU member state is 58% more likely to ratify post-Cold War treaties than is a state which is not a member of the EU. Models 3 and 4 are estimated in parallel to models 1 and 2, but are based on the dichotomous variable *NEW DEMOCRACY*. Holding other variables constant, we find that new democracies are more likely to commit to international agreements than other states (model 3: 36%, model 4: 34%).⁹ Model 4 also shows that EU members are 92% more likely to ratify multilateral treaties. In models 5 and 6 we incorporate an interaction term for *NEW DEMOCRACIES* and *EU* in order to test the ratification likelihood of “new EU democracy” against “new non-EU democracy.” Model 5 is a reduced model and presents the estimated effect for the main variable (*NEW DEMOCRACIES*EU*). In model 6 we control for the other relevant factors and include the issue area variables: *SECURITY*, *ENVIRONMENT* and *HUMAN RIGHTS*. In both models our main variable is statistically significant. Following model 5, a new EU democracy is 59% more likely to ratify a multilateral post-Cold War treaty than is a new democracy outside the EU; and under the *ceteris paribus* assumption the effect is 54% (models 6).¹⁰ The ratification likelihood also differs across major issue areas. We find the highest effect for *SECURITY* on treaty ratification (110%). For new EU democracies the likelihood of ratifying security treaties is 45% higher than for human rights treaties and 48% higher than for environmental treaties.¹¹ As regards the other controls, we find no robust and statistically significant effect for *MILITARY POWER*, *TRADE OPENNESS*, *COLONIAL PAST* and *STATE DURATION*. Overall, the statistical results strongly confirm that newly established EU democracies are at the forefront of multilateralism.¹²

Evidence from Parliamentary Debates

Since “legislatures in democracies play a crucial role in signaling state preferences and in making international commitments” (Kydd 2009:300), we analyze parliamentary debates over treaty ratification in Central and Eastern Europe between 1992 and 2007 to study states’ motives for treaty ratification. While in most cases the government is responsible for presenting the rationale for ratification to the legislature, the actual decision for or against ratification is taken by a parliamentary vote following debates where representatives table arguments (based on preferences) in support of or in opposition to ratification. The debates reveal how disputed or undisputed ratification is domestically.

The analysis of the parliamentary debates involves five newly democratized states and 17 multilateral treaties. Below, we briefly describe the rationale for our selection of countries and treaties and provide evidence from parliamentary debates on treaty ratification.

The selected countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania. These countries differ with regard to a number of key characteristics. First, the selected countries are in different geographic locations in Europe: Estonia represents the group of Baltic States; Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are located in Central Europe; Romania is in South-Eastern Europe. Second, the date of EU accession differs. The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic and Estonia joined the EU in 2004; Romania acceded in 2007. Third, the countries differ in size. Poland is the largest in terms of area and population (38.1 million) followed by Romania (21.5 million), Czech Republic (10.5 million) and Slovakia (5.4 million). Estonia is the smallest country in terms of territory and population size (1.3 million). Finally, as far as ethnic composition is concerned, Poland and the Czech Republic are relatively homogeneous nation states. In Romania and Slovakia ethnic minorities account for about 10% of the population (Hungarians are the largest minority in both countries). Estonia is a fairly heterogeneous country, with Russians being the greatest ethnic minority (around 25%) (European Union 2012).

We chose a subset of 17 particularly significant treaties from our full sample. An overview of the selected treaties, including the ratification dates for the five countries is presented in table A2. These treaties include some of the most significant international law instruments post-1990 (examples are the Kyoto Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). We expect parliaments not simply to rubberstamp governments' decisions, but to engage in a proper ratification debate.¹³ The subset of the selected agreements also cuts across different issue areas; it includes six treaties on the environment; seven on trade¹⁴, three each on security and human rights; two in the area of criminal law and two on culture. Finally, the selection of treaties covers the entire period of analysis from the early 1990s to 2007. Four of the treaties were concluded before 1996, ten between 1996 and 2000, and three after 2000 (see table A2). Of the subset of 17 treaties, the Czech Republic did not ratify two treaties, and Estonia and Poland one treaty each. All 17 treaties have been adopted in Romania and Slovakia.

Statements during Parliamentary Ratification Debates

In order to test the exact signals sent by new EU democracies when ratifying multilateral agreements (1. RECOGNITION, 2. STRATEGIC AUTONOMY, 3. PLEASING EU), we analyzed the content of parliamentary debates. We engaged five coders with the linguistic skills to search and translate parliamentary debates over ratification of the selected treaties. The available data enabled us to study 58 parliamentary debates.¹⁵

The parliamentary debates strongly support our argument that treaty ratification serves specific strategic foreign policy objectives. While we found evidence for outward-oriented signaling toward the international community, the EU and Russia, we found no evidence that would indicate a government strategy to lock in domestic politics through intergovernmental networks.¹⁶

Overall we recorded 62 statements from 42 debates.¹⁷ Most of the statements confirming our expectations were made in debates held in the Polish parliament (16

statements; 26% of all statements), followed by Estonia (14 statements; 23%) and Romania (13 statements; 21%). In the ratification debates of the Slovak National Council 10 such statements were made (amounting to 16% of all statements). For the Czech Republic, where fewer debates were available, we counted 9 statements (15%) (see tables 3 and A3).

More than half of all statements (52%) indicate willingness to follow the European lead in multilateralism.¹⁸ Statements in support of European norms and values were made most frequently in the Romanian debates (accounting for 28% of all statements referring to the PLEASING EU signal). The objective of achieving international acceptance and recognition by the international community was signaled in 18 statements (29% of all statements). International recognition was the most prominent concern in the Polish parliamentary debates (33% of the statements related to the RECOGNITION signal).¹⁹ Twelve statements refer to the attempts to pursue strategic autonomy (amounting to 19% of all statements). Most such statements were made in the Estonian debates (6 in total coming to 50% of all STRATEGIC AUTONOMY statements).²⁰

To account for the possibility that commitment to multilateral treaties might simply represent opportunistic behavior, we searched the parliamentary ratification debates for statements other than external signaling. We found eight statements in the debates in Estonia, Poland and Romania that did not fall under one of the three major signaling arguments but which refer to other signals such as eligibility for financial assistance (see table A3). As such references were sporadic, we can rule out the possibility that commitment to multilateral treaties is predominantly driven by opportunistic considerations. Conversely, we found no evidence that new European democracies joined multilateral treaties for truly sincere reasons (believing in the virtue of multilateralism as the right form of international cooperation).

TABLE 3. Contingency Table with Absolute and Relative Statement Frequencies by Country and Signal

Signal	RECOGNITION	STRATEGIC AUTONOMY	PLEASING EU	Total
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Country				
Czech Republic	3 (17%)	1 (8%)	5 (16%)	9 (15%)
Estonia	2 (11%)	6 (50%)	6 (19%)	14 (23%)
Poland	6 (33%)	3 (25%)	7 (22%)	16 (26%)
Romania	3 (17%)	1 (8%)	9 (28%)	13 (21%)
Slovakia	4 (22%)	1 (8%)	5 (16%)	10 (16%)
Total	18 (29%)	12 (19%)	32 (52%)	62 (100%)

The number of statements also varies across the issue areas addressed in multilateral treaties. Most statements were made in relation to security treaties (19 in number, amounting to 31% of all statements): eight statements referred to the aspect of gaining international RECOGNITION; seven referred to PLEASING EU; and four addressed the need for STRATEGIC AUTONOMY. Overall, seventeen statements (27%) were made in the context of environmental treaties of which a majority addressed the aspect of EU membership (41%). Thirteen statements concerned ratification of treaties with criminal law provisions (21%), five statements have been recorded in relation to human rights agreements (8%), and four statements with respect to trade and cultural provisions (6% each) (see table 4).

In conclusion, parliamentary ratification debates provide strong evidence of the relative importance of the three signals outlined in the theoretical section.

TABLE 4. Contingency Table with Absolute and Relative Statement Frequencies by Issue Area and Signal

Signal	RECOGNITION	STRATEGIC AUTONOMY	PLEASING EU	Total
Issue area				
Environment	3 (17%)	1 (8%)	13 (41%)	17 (27%)
Security	8 (44%)	4 (33%)	7 (22%)	19 (31%)
Crime	4 (22%)	4 (33%)	5 (16%)	13 (21%)
Human Rights	2 (11%)	0 (0%)	3 (9%)	5 (8%)
Culture	0 (0%)	2 (17%)	2 (6%)	4 (6%)
Trade	1 (6%)	1 (8%)	2 (6%)	4 (6%)
Total	18 (29%)	12 (19%)	32 (52%)	62 (100%)

European and Other New Democracies Compared

In this section we contrast parliamentary debates on the ratifications of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol) in new European democracies with parliamentary debates in two new democracies in Latin America (Chile and Uruguay).²¹ This comparison illustrates different rationales for ratifying multilateral treaties in new democracies within and outside Europe. The choice of two contentious treaties should also make potential lock-in strategies more visible, should they be present.²²

In the case of European states, the evidence for these two treaties emphasizes the importance of the EU signal, although arguments related to recognition and autonomous policy-making were also found. For the Latin American countries, none of these external signals seems relevant for the decision to ratify.²³ Both agreements arouse significant domestic political opposition in Chile and Uruguay. The process of parliamentary ratification was tedious and dragged on for a long time in both countries (Chile has not yet ratified the Cartagena Protocol). The Rome Statute, which could potentially serve as a lock-in device for domestic criminal law provisions, judicial practice or even constitutional reforms was opposed by important segments of society. This made it difficult for the governing parties to proceed toward ratification. In addition, both countries took some political risks in pursuing ratification since the US did not ratify either of the two agreements.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 and established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the objective of prosecuting individuals for specific crimes (for example, genocide and crimes against humanity). The Court complements national judicial systems: it can only exercise jurisdiction where national courts are unable or unwilling to do so. So far 118 states have ratified the Statute.

Ratification debates in new democracies in Europe were characterized by a low degree of contestation. Only a handful of critical voices were raised. Poland ratified the Statute in 2001. Members of Parliament (MPs) recalled the great importance the EU attached to the Statute. Special reference was made to a resolution of the European Parliament which stated that ratification of the Statute is necessary for EU accession. One MP mentioned that being among the first 60 ratifying states would improve institutional access to and representation in the Court. Only one MP questioned whether ratifying the Statute would limit Polish sovereignty and be inconsistent with the national constitution (Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2001).

In Romania the debate took place in 2002. The State Secretary of the Ministry of Justice noted that ratification supports “Romania’s decision to integrate into the structures of European Union and to assume its responsibilities within the international community. In addition, it will ensure Romania’s participation to the first general meeting of the signatory states” (Parlamentul României 2002). This statement also reflected the views of other MPs and suggests that ratification of this treaty was associated with concerns about autonomous decision-making in foreign policy (Parlamentul României 2002). The Statute was finally ratified by the Senate in the same year with 88 votes in favor, 3 against, and 3 abstentions.

Ratification in Latin American countries was more complicated. In particular, the case of Chile stands out. Chile was the last Latin American country to ratify the Statute. Having signed the Rome Statute, the Chilean President asked the Parliament to consider an implementation act to meet the obligations under the Statute. On 22 January 2002 the Chamber of Deputies passed the implementation bill with 67 of 116 votes (Camara de Diputados 2002). During the parliamentary debate, critical voices were raised regarding constitutional conformity, national sovereignty and US opposition to the Statute. Nevertheless, the debate was dominated by concerns that international law could constrain national courts’ interpretations of existing amnesty laws that protected members of the

Pinochet regime. Following the vote, 35 conservative MPs took the issue to the constitutional court which ruled that a constitutional amendment would be necessary (Guzmán Dalbora 2006:173–4). As a result, the government was forced to engage in a long and burdensome constitutional reform process. It was not until 17 June 2009 that the Chilean Chamber of Deputies passed the ratification act with 79 votes in favor, 9 in opposition and 1 abstention.

The ratification process in Uruguay was also quite politicized and characterized by disagreement over the implementation act. Similar to the Chilean case, many MPs argued that the Rome Statute would challenge the Uruguayan constitution (Camara de Senadores 2002). The government, anticipating opposition from former members of the military regime, refrained from proposing an amendment of the constitution. Instead, it proposed an interpretative declaration to clarify the relationship between obligations flowing from the international treaty and the existing Constitution. This declaration elevated the Constitution above the Statute and was criticized by many states, in particular European states, as a *de facto* reservation which was not permissible under the Rome Statute. Ultimately, the Uruguayan parliament accepted the implementation act and ratified the Rome Statute on 27 June 2002 (Galain Palermo 2006:403). Yet, the implementation act has dragged on for many years. Similar to the Chilean case, it took a long time for the domestic courts (and constitutional amendments) to prepare the ground to hold former dictator Juan Maria Bordaberry accountable for violations of human rights. In sum, in both Latin American countries it proved difficult for the governments to bring the internal lock-in signal into play; external signaling on the other hand was absent.

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

The Cartagena Protocol supplements the Convention on Biological Diversity and regulates the safe handling, transport and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology (Biosafety Clearing-House 2012). The Protocol obliges state parties to

inform other governments about the intentional transboundary movement of LMOs and to wait for acceptance prior to transport. The Protocol was adopted on 29 January 2000 and counts to date 161 parties.

The ratification of the Cartagena Protocol generated only little political debate in the parliaments of the new European democracies. Given that the EU was a strong supporter of the main objectives of the Protocol and the regulation of LMOs in Europe has to be applied in EU candidate countries, the ratification of the Protocol was not contested. In the Czech Republic, the Minister of Environment presented a proposal for the ratification of the Cartagena Protocol (in the first reading) to the Chamber of Deputies in late 2000. He proposed two major reasons for accepting the Protocol: First, ratification would strengthen the international prestige of the Czech Republic, and second, it would be an important step in the preparations for EU accession. Similar statements were made during the second reading (Poslanecká Sněmovna Parlamentu České Republiky 2000, 2001). The Protocol was adopted by 78 votes with 27 abstentions.

During the ratification debate in the Estonian parliament in 2003, the Minister of Environment stressed that ratification of the Protocol was necessary for both political and economic reasons. In particular, he highlighted that the EU had already ratified the Protocol and that “Estonia has to assure the protection of the environment, human health and fulfill the obligations coming from joining the EU.” In addition, he argued that “if Estonia ratifies the protocol, it will open doors for certain UN financing opportunities” (Riigikogu 2003). With the exception of this reference to monetary incentives, a closer look at the debates in Eastern European countries confirms that the decision to ratify was largely grounded on reputational concerns and the desire to please the EU.

Ratification processes in Latin America took much longer; this is partially due to the negotiation history of the Protocol. Uruguay and Chile participated actively in negotiations through the US-led Miami Group. As important LMOs exporting countries they attempted to

limit the Protocol's impact on free trade in LMOs, fearing the misuse of legal instruments (for example, on the basis of the precautionary principle) for protectionist purposes (Bail, Falkner and Marquard 2002). While they were not satisfied with the outcome, they achieved some concessions in the negotiations. Chile and Uruguay signed the agreement in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Chile started the ratification process soon after, but did not ratify the Protocol to date. Uruguay initiated the ratification process at the end of 2008 and only ratified in November 2011. In an earlier report to its parliament, the Uruguayan Government noted that 147 parties (including Brazil and Paraguay) had already ratified the Protocol. Lagging behind with its ratification, Uruguay had been unable to participate in four conferences of the parties regarding the future development of the Protocol. This undermined its strategic position and decreased its influence over the subsequent design of the Protocol (Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales 2010).

The lengthy ratification process of the Cartagena Protocol can mainly be attributed to perceived costs of the agreement, which have been already a point of disapproval during negotiations. Moreover, due to the nature of the treaty there were no lock-in attempts.

Conclusions

European states have been at the forefront of multilateralism since the end of the Cold War. However, the fact that new EU democracies have been especially interested in multilateral treaties has so far been overlooked in the literature. We have provided a theoretical explanation for new European democracies' strong propensity to ratify multilateral agreements.

New European democracies ratify multilateral treaties as a signal to help them achieve three major foreign policy objectives: to obtain international recognition, to please the EU and to foster their strategic autonomy for future foreign policy making. The evidence from parliamentary ratification debates in five new European democracies shows that the "EU

signal” has been the dominant consideration in these debates, whereas substantive statements not involving these three objectives have been very rare. What is more, new European democracies have set aside sovereignty concerns in their post-Cold War rush to ratification. Although domestic opponents often regard multilateral engagement as reducing sovereignty, external signals helped to override such considerations.

By comparison, new democracies in other regions face different incentives for joining multilateral treaties. Ratification debates in Latin American countries reveal that sovereignty costs have been more relevant for the decision (not) to ratify multilateral treaties. In the absence of a strong regional institution that could facilitate domestic lock in, the signaling value of multilateral treaties is greatly diminished. This is reflected in the slower ratification pace and overall fewer commitments.

What are the wider theoretical implications of our findings? We have offered a more nuanced reading of the lock-in argument in relation to new democracies. Our analysis shows that new European democracies use multilateral commitments for external signaling, but not necessarily for locking in major domestic reforms. This hints toward a division of labor between multilateral and regional institutions in the process of democratic consolidation. If new democracies have a credible regional organization available, they will use it for major domestic institutional renovations, and use multilateral treaties for external signaling. Future research should investigate the distinct roles of regional and multilateral institutions in democratization and also explore how to enhance their complementarity.

What are the policy implications for the future orientation of new(er) EU democracies vis-à-vis multilateralism? While the EU signal has lost traction for states that have already joined the EU, states preparing for EU accession will continue participating in international agreements in which the EU shows substantial interest. In this respect, it is not surprising that Croatia supports the Kyoto 2 framework for a new Climate agreement which is strongly

advocated by the EU. In addition, gaining international recognition and strategic autonomy will remain important reasons for states to ratify multilateral treaties swiftly.

Appendix 1: Additional Tables.
TABLE A1. Selected Multilateral Treaties

<i>Treaty</i>	<i>adopted</i>	<i>restricted mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
1 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety	2000	2004	1.799	2000	2008	150	77.72
2 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	1996	2001	3.081	1996	2008	146	75.65
3 Convention on Biological Diversity	1992	1995	2.653	1992	2008	188	97.41
4 Convention on Nuclear Safety	1994	1998	3.767	1994	2008	62	32.12
5 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	1992	1998	3.616	1993	2008	180	93.26
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	1997	2000	2.388	1997	2007	153	79.27
7 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel	1994	2001	3.297	1995	2008	87	45.08
8 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas	1993	2000	4.199	1994	2008	34	17.62
9 FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture	2001	2004	1.529	2002	2008	116	60.1
10 Hague Private International Law (PIL) Convention on Choice of Court Agreements	2005	2007	0	2007	2007	1	0.52
11 Hague PIL Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children	1996	2006	2.646	2003	2008	3	1.55
12 Hague PIL Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption	1993	2000	3.859	1994	2008	76	39.38
13 Hague PIL Convention on the International Protection of Adults	2000	2003	2.939	1997	2008	15	7.77
14 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste	1997	2002	2.995	1998	2008	45	23.32
15 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection	1991	2001	3.99	1992	2008	138	71.5
16 International Cocoa Agreement	2001	2003	1.088	2001	2005	16	8.29
17 International Coffee Agreement	2000	2003	1.74	2001	2008	69	35.75
18 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	2005	2007	0.78	2006	2008	47	24.35
19 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings	1997	2003	2.095	1998	2008	160	82.9
20 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism	1999	2003	1.744	2000	2008	166	86.01
21 International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages	1993	2001	3.848	1995	2007	12	6.22
22 International Convention on the Arrest of Ships	1999	2002	1.604	2001	2005	7	3.63
23 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW)	1990	2002	4.318	1993	2008	39	20.21
24 ILO Home Work Convention	1996	2001	3.13	1998	2006	5	2.59

(*Note.* restricted mean: average year of ratifications; sd: standard deviation for ratification in years; min: earliest year of ratification; max: latest year of ratification; N: number of ratifications; %: percentage of ratifications. Restricted mean and sd refer to the ratifications made; restricted mean is rounded to the actual calendar year (for example, 2005.7 is written as 2005)).

TABLE A1 (continued). Selected Multilateral Treaties

<i>Treaty</i>	<i>adopted</i>	<i>restricted mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
25 ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention	1999	2002	1.966	1999	2008	168	87.05
26 International Maritime Organization (IMO) Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea	1996	2004	2.84	2000	2008	13	6.74
27 IMO International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation	1990	2000	4.668	1992	2008	97	50.26
28 IMO International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments	2004	2007	1.32	2005	2008	17	8.81
29 IMO International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships	2001	2006	1.974	2002	2008	34	17.62
30 IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances	2000	2005	2.117	2002	2008	23	11.92
31 IMO Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage	2001	2006	1.722	2003	2008	32	16.58
32 International Tropical Timber Agreement	1994	1997	2.578	1994	2006	60	31.09
33 International Sugar Agreement	1992	1998	5.364	1992	2008	58	30.05
34 Kyoto Protocol	1997	2003	2.424	1998	2008	180	93.26
35 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	2000	2004	1.965	2000	2008	125	64.77
36 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	2000	2004	2.013	2000	2008	129	66.84
37 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	2001	2005	1.673	2002	2008	77	39.9
38 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	2000	2004	1.751	2001	2008	114	59.07
39 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Protocol IV of the 1980 (to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons)	1995	2000	3.034	1996	2008	88	45.6
40 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons)	2003	2006	1.32	2004	2008	49	25.39
41 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons)	1996	2001	3.064	1997	2008	91	47.15
42 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	2000	2004	1.751	2001	2008	123	63.73
43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	1998	2002	1.86	1999	2008	107	55.44
44 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade	1998	2004	2.175	1999	2008	124	64.25
45 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	1999	2004	2.293	2000	2008	51	26.42
46 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)	2001	2004	1.714	2001	2008	155	80.31
47 UN Convention against Corruption	2003	2006	1.245	2003	2008	121	62.69

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TABLE A1 (continued). Selected Multilateral Treaties

<i>Treaty</i>	<i>adopted</i>	<i>restricted mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
48 UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks	1995	2002	3.926	1996	2008	71	36.79
49 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	2000	2004	1.74	2001	2008	143	74.09
50 UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit	1995	2000	3.162	1997	2005	8	4.15
51 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property	2004	2007	0.983	2006	2008	6	3.11
52 UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade	2001	2005		2005	2005	1	0.52
53 UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade	1991	2001	4.243	1996	2005	4	2.07
54 UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes	1997	2001	3.167	1998	2007	16	8.29
55 UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts	2005	No ratifications, yet.					
56 UN Convention to Combat Desertification	1994	1998	2.185	1995	2007	190	98.45
57 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change	1992	1995	2.511	1992	2007	189	97.93
58 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage	2003	2006	1.155	2004	2008	105	54.4
59 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions	2005	2007	0.754	2005	2008	91	47.15
60 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage	2001	2006	1.538	2003	2008	20	10.36
61 UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport	2005	2007	0.908	2005	2008	103	53.37
62 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects	1995	2001	3.06	1997	2007	29	15.03
63 UNIDROIT Convention and Protocol on International Interests in Mobile Equipment	2001	2006	1.645	2003	2008	25	12.95
64 World Customs Organization (WCO) Revised Kyoto Convention	1999	2004	2.286	1999	2008	57	29.53
65 World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control	2003	2005	1.147	2003	2008	157	81.35
66 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty	1996	2002	2.936	1997	2008	68	35.23
67 WIPO Trademark Law Treaty	1994	2000	4.06	1995	2008	46	23.83
68 WIPO Patent Law Treaty	2000	2005	2.293	2001	2008	19	9.84
69 WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty	1996	2003	2.993	1998	2008	68	35.23
70 WTO Umbrella Agreement	1994	1996	2.787	1995	2008	150	77.72
71 WTO General Agreement on Trade in Goods	1994	1996	2.787	1995	2008	150	77.72
72 WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services	1994	1996	2.787	1995	2008	150	77.72
73 WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights	1994	1996	2.787	1995	2008	150	77.72
74 WTO Dispute Settlement	1994	1996	2.787	1995	2008	150	77.72
75 WTO Trade Policy Review	1994	1996	2.787	1995	2008	150	77.72
76 WTO Government Procurement	1994	1999	4.024	1996	2007	37	19.17

TABLE A2. Selected Treaties and Ratification Dates

<i>Treaty</i>	<i>Concluded</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Czech Republic</i>	<i>Estonia</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Romania</i>	<i>Slovakia</i>
<i>Environment</i>							
Convention on Biological Diversity	1992	CBD	1993	1994	1996	1994	1994
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change	1992	FCCC	1993	1994	1994	1994	1994
Kyoto Protocol	1997	KP	2001	2002	2002	2001	2002
Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade	1998	RC	2000	2006	2005	2003	2007
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety	2000	CPB	2001	2004	2003	2003	2003
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants	2001	SC	2002	2009	2009	2004	2002
<i>Security</i>							
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	1992	CWC	1996	1999	1995	1995	1995
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	1996	NTBT	1997	1999	1999	1999	1998
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	1997	CAM	1999	2004	---	2000	1999
<i>Crime</i>							
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	1998	RSICC	2009	2002	2001	2002	2002
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea	2000	PSM	---	2004	2003	2002	2004
<i>Human Rights</i>							
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention	1999	C182	2001	2001	2002	2000	1999
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict	2000	OPAC	2001	---	2005	2001	2006
Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography	2000	OPCP	---	2004	2005	2001	2004
<i>Culture</i>							
UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage	2003	CICH	2009	2006	2011	2006	2006
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions	2005	CDCE	2010	2006	2007	2006	2006
<i>Trade</i>							
WTO Agreements	1994	WTO	1995	1999	1995	1995	1995

TABLE A3. Statements in Parliamentary Debates on Treaty Ratification

	<i>Czech Republic</i>	<i>Estonia</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Romania</i>	<i>Slovakia</i>
<i>Environment</i>					
CBD	NA		2/OA	2	
FCCC	NA	OA	NA	NA	
KP	NA	2	1/2	2/OA	
RC	2	3	NA	OA	2
CPB	1/2	2/OA	NA	2	1/2
SC	2	NA	2/OA	NA	2
<i>Security</i>					
CWC		3	1/3/OA	1/2	NA
NTBT	1/3	1/2	1/OA	1	1
CAM	2	2/3	NR	2	1/2
<i>Crime</i>					
RSICC	NA	1/2/3	1/2/3	1/2/3	2
PSM	NR	NA	1/2/3	NA	
<i>Human Rights</i>					
C182	1/2		NA	NA	
OPAC		NR	1	NA	
OPCP	NR	NA	2	2	
<i>Culture</i>					
CICH	NA	3	NA	2	3
CDCE	NA		NA	2	
<i>Trade</i>					
WTO	NA	2/3	2	NA	1
NRs	2	1	1	0	0
NAs	7	3	6	6	1
No. of debates	8	13	10	11	16

(Note. 1, RECOGNITION; 2, PLEASING EU; 3, STRATEGIC AUTONOMY; NR, not ratified; NA, information on debate not available; OA, Other arguments raised in parliamentary debate; blank, information available, but no arguments found. For definitions of treaty abbreviations see Table A2).

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² We see recognition analytically prior to reputation; the latter develops over time and is related to implementation of international treaties (Guzman 2008). Reputation is “contingent on its past behaviour” and “the knowledge that today’s conduct will affect tomorrow’s reputation” (Guzman 2008:86). Therefore, at first, this factor could be called recognition and later, in the 1990s, reputation. For simplicity we call it recognition.

³ The data for a subject is presented as multiple rows or “observations,” each of which applies to an interval of observation (start, stop].

⁴ For a detailed description of the data structure and statistical techniques see Milewicz (2010).

⁵ In this study, we are confronted with fixed right-censoring and left-truncation. Fixed right-censoring applies to all states which had not yet ratified a particular treaty at termination of the analysis in December 2008. Left-truncation is determined by a delayed entry time. Delayed entry times apply to successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

⁶ This excludes states that are still in the process of accession (and who eventually will become members).

⁷ The original calculation is based on Central Intelligence Agency (2008); cross-checked with the Correlates of War Project (2008).

⁸ The hazard ratio must be independent of time. This defines the *proportional hazards property*. Results from the test for constancy of the coefficients based on scaled Schoenfeld residuals indicate that the assumption of the proportional hazards is met by all covariates.

⁹ The hazard ratio for NEW DEMOCRACY is calculated by $\exp(\text{coef}_{\text{NEW DEMOCRACY}}) = 1.36 = 36\%$.

¹⁰ The hazard ratio for a new EU democracy compared with a new non-EU democracy is calculated by $\exp(\text{coef}_{\text{EU}} + \text{coef}_{\text{EU*NEW DEMOCRACY}})$.

¹¹ The hazard ratio is calculated by $\exp(\text{coef}_{\text{SECURITY}})/\exp(\text{coef}_{\text{HUMAN RIGHTS}})$.

¹² As the ratification likelihood for new democracies might differ between three time periods: i) the period between the end of communism and the beginning of accession negotiations; ii) the period of accession negotiations; and iii) the full-membership period – we have also tested the results based on a subsample of treaties open for ratification during the period of accession negotiations. The results did not change the general pattern.

¹³ This choice allows us to gather sufficient information on parliamentary debates upon treaty ratification.

¹⁴ As the WTO agreements have been debated and ratified as one agreement, we count the WTO agreements as one treaty.

¹⁵ For the Czech Republic we recorded eight debates (two treaties were not debated and not ratified; seven debates were not available). Ten parliamentary debates were accessible for Poland (six debates were not available; one treaty has not been debated and ratified to date), eleven debates for Romania (six debates were not available) and thirteen debates for Estonia (three debates were not available; one treaty has not been debated and ratified). Debates on

the ratification of sixteen treaties were available in the case of Slovakia (only one debate was not available).

¹⁶ In addition, we cross-checked these findings with media reports where available.

¹⁷ We do not distinguish between statements made in the first and second chamber in case of bicameral parliamentary systems. We counted statements made by one or more parliamentarians referring to the same signal in a treaty debate as a single statement.

¹⁸ We also examined whether other statements than those supporting the three signals were made during the debates; these are reported in Table A3 of the appendix. We found hardly any statements other than those reported here. “Negative statements”, such as statements that criticized the EU, occurred as well.

¹⁹ This is attributable to Poland’s history and the three partitions of the state. With the third partition (1795–1918) Poland lost its independence and recognition as a nation state (Davies 2001).

²⁰ Given the Estonian experience of military occupation and annexation by the USSR (Lane 1997; Thompson 1998), the frequency of such references in the Estonian parliament is not surprising.

²¹ Parliamentary ratification debates in Europe on the other selected treaties have developed similarly. Due to lack of space, we do not report all our findings.

²² Chile and Uruguay have been chosen among Latin American countries due to availability of parliamentary records.

²³ We did not expect to find the “pleasing EU” signal to play a role in these two non-European countries.